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Abstract. We propose a continuous-time heterogeneous agent model consisting
of fundamental, momentum, and contrarian traders to explain the significant time
series momentum. We show that the performance of momentum strategy is de-
termined by both time horizon and the market dominance of momentum traders.
Specifically, when momentum traders are more active in the market, momentum
strategies with short (long) time horizons stabilize (destabilize) the market, and
meanwhile the market under-reacts (over-reacts) in short-run (long-run). This
provides profit opportunity for time series momentum strategies with short hori-
zons and reversal with long horizons. When momentum traders are less active in
the market, they always lose. The results provide an insight into the profitability
of time series momentum documented in recent empirical studies.
Key words: Time series momentum, profitability, market stability, stochastic delay
differential equations.
JEL Classification: C62, D53, D84, G12
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1. Introduction
This paper studies time series momentum and its profitability in financial markets.
Time series momentum investigated recently in Moskowitz, Ooi and Pedersen (2012)
characterizes a strong positive predictability of a security’s own past returns. For
a large set of futures and forward contracts, Moskowitz et al. (2012) find a time
series momentum or “trend” effect based on past 12 month excess returns persists
for 1 to 12 months that partially reverses over longer time horizons. This effect
based purely on a security’s own past returns is related to, but different from,
the cross-sectional momentum phenomenon studied extensively in the literature.
Through return decomposition, Moskowitz et al. (2012) argue that positive auto-
covariance is the main driving force for time series momentum and cross-sectional
momentum effects, while the contribution of serial cross-correlations and variation
in mean returns is small. This paper introduces a model to provide an explanation
on the profitability of time series momentum over short horizons and reversal over
longer horizons.
To explain the time series momentum, we introduce a simple continuous-time as-
set pricing model consisting of three types of agents based on typical fundamental,
momentum, and contrarian trading strategies. Fundamental agents trade based on
the expectation of mean-reversion of market price to the fundamental price; while
momentum and contrarian agents trade respectively based on the continuation and
reverse of the past price trends over different time horizons. The market price is
determined via a market maker mechanism. The model, characterized by a sto-
chastic delay integro-differential system, provides a unified approach to examine the
impact of different time horizons of momentum and contrarian strategies on market
stability and profitability of these strategies. We show that profitability is closely
related to the activity of momentum traders and market stability. In particular, we
show that: (i) momentum trading destabilizes the market, while contrarian trad-
ing stabilizes the market; (ii) the profitability of momentum strategies is related
positively to the activity of momentum traders and negatively to the time horizon
used for estimating the price trend; (iii) when momentum traders are more active in
the market, the market price under-reacts in short-run and over-reacts in long-run,
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leading to profitability of momentum strategies with short horizons and loss with
longer horizons. The analysis provides an insight into the profitability of time series
momentum documented in Moskowitz et al. (2012).
The size and apparent persistence of momentum profits have attracted consider-
able attention. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) and Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny
(1994) find supporting evidence on the profitability of contrarian strategies for a
holding period of 3-5 years based on the past 3 to 5 year returns. In contrast,
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993, 2001) among many others, find supporting evidence
on the profitability of momentum strategies for a holding period of 3-12 months
based on the returns over past 3-12 months.1 It is clearly that the time horizons
and holding periods play crucial roles in the performance of contrarian and mo-
mentum strategies. Many theoretical studies have tried to explain the momentum,2
however, as argued in Griffin, Ji and Martin (2003), “the comparison is in some
sense unfair since no time horizon is specified in most behavioral models”. This pa-
per provides a uniform treatment on various time horizons used in momentum and
contrarian trading strategies and develops an intuitive and parsimonious financial
market model of heterogeneous agents in a continuous-time framework to study the
impact of different time horizons on the market. To our knowledge, this is the first
1In addition to individual stock momentum, Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999) show industry
momentum for a holding period of 1 to 12 months based on past 1 to 12 months and long-run
reversals. George and Hwang (2004) find the momentum in price levels by investigating 52-week
high. Recently, Novy-Marx (2012) find the term-structure momentum that is primarily driven by
firm’s performance 12 to 7 months prior to portfolio formation. The evidence has been extended
to commodity futures markets (Miffre and Rallis 2007), international markets (Antoniou, Lam and
Paudyal 2007) and different asset classes (Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen 2013).
2Among which, the three-factor model of Fama and French (1996) can explain long-run reversal
but not short-run momentum. Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998)’s model with single
representative agent and Hong and Stein (1999)’s model with different trader types attribute the
under- and overreaction to overconfidence and biased self-attribution. Sagi and Seasholes (2007)
present a growth option model to identify observable firm-specific attributes that drive momentum.
Recently, Vayanos and Woolley (2013) show the slow-moving capital can also generate momentum.
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paper to analyze a financial market model with all three types of fundamental, mo-
mentum, and contrarian strategies with specified time horizons in a continuous-time
framework.
The state of the market is also a critically important factor that affects the prof-
itability as shown in Griffin et al. (2003) and Lou and Polk (2013).3 Different
investment strategies play different roles in market stability and have different im-
plications on market states. Intuitively, momentum strategies are based on the hy-
pothesis of under-reaction with the expectation that the future price will follow the
price trend. Consequently the strategies tend to destabilise the market price when
momentum traders are more active in the market. While contrarian strategies are
based on the hypothesis of overreaction with the expectation that the future price
will go against the price trend. Therefore the strategies can stabilize the market
when contrarian traders are more active in the market. However, the joint impact
of both strategies on market stability can be complicated, depending on their ac-
tivities in the market. We show that (i) when market is dominated by fundamental
and contrarian traders, the market is stabilizing and momentum strategies do not
generate profit; (ii) when the activity of momentum traders is “balanced” by the
activities of fundamental and contrarian traders, there is a significant overreaction
in short horizons and hence momentum trading is not profitable; (iii) when market
is dominated by momentum traders, the market is destabilized and can under-react
in short-run but over-react in long-run. The results are consistent with the “crowded
trading” proposed by Lou and Polk (2013) that “the underreaction or overreaction
characteristic of momentum is time-varying, crucially depending on the size of the
3Cooper, Gutierrez and Hameed (2004) find that short-run (6 months) momentum strategies
make profits in up market and lose in down market, but the up-market momentum profits reverse
in the long-run (13-60 months). Hou, Peng and Xiong (2009) find momentum strategies with short
time horizon (1 year) are not profitable in down market, but return significant profits in up market.
Similar results of profitability are also reported in Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) that commonly
using macroeconomic instruments related to the business cycle can generate positive returns to
momentum strategies during expansionary periods and negative returns during recessions.
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momentum crowd”. In addition, we find that, with momentum crowd, the momen-
tum trading leads to gain for the strategies with short horizons and loss for the
strategies with longer horizons.
This paper is closely related to the literature on the use of technical trading rules.
Despite the efficient market hypothesis of financial markets in the academic finance
literature (Fama 1970), the use of technical trading rules based on past returns,
in particular momentum and contrarian strategies, still seems to be widespread
amongst financial market practitioners (Allen and Taylor 1990). The profitability
of these strategies and their consistency with the efficient market hypothesis have
been investigated extensively in the literature.4 Recently, Zhu and Zhou (2009)
demonstrate that technical analysis, especially the moving average rules, can be a
valuable learning tool in general under model or parameter uncertainty. Different
from the above studies, which examine profitability by directly applying technical
trading rules to the financial data without impacting market price; this paper how-
ever shows profitability can also come from the impact of technical trading strategies
on market price. Therefore, the momentum strategies can be self-fulfilling.
The modeling approach used in this paper is different from the traditional ap-
proach. In the traditional continuous-time asset pricing literature, the underlying
processes are Markov. The market price determined by market equilibrium is con-
sistent with the Markov processes. However, when modelling time series momentum
that depends on history prices, the underlying processes become non-Markov. This
makes it difficult to have consistence between the optimal demands driven by util-
ity maximization and the equilibrium price process. Therefore this paper follows
the literature of heterogeneous agent models (HAMs) and focuses on behavior as-
pects of investors. Over the last three decades, empirical evidence, unconvincing
justifications of the assumption of unbounded rationality and the recognition of the
relevance of investor psychology have led to the incorporation of heterogeneous and
boundedly rational behaviors of investors, such as trend chasing and switching, into
asset pricing and financial market modelling. HAMs consider financial markets as
4See for example, Frankel and Froot (1986), Neftci (1991), Brock, Lakonishok and LeBaron
(1992), Neely, Weller and Dittmar (1997) and Allen and Karjalainen (1999).
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expectation feedback systems where asset price fluctuations can be driven by an
endogenous mechanism with heterogeneity and bounded rationality. By considering
two types of traders, typically fundamentalists and trend followers, Beja and Gold-
man (1980) and Chiarella (1992) among many others have shown that interaction
of agents with heterogeneous expectations may lead to market instability. More
significantly, Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998) introduce the concept of an adap-
tively rational equilibrium in a discrete-time framework. Agents adapt their beliefs
over time by choosing from different predictors or expectation functions based upon
their past performance (such as realized profits). Such boundedly rational behavior
of agents can lead to chaotic market price. HAMs have also been extended to explain
the excessive and asymmetric volatility by incorporating the reflection effect of the
prospect theory (Park 2014). Most of the HAMs are in discrete-time rather than
continuous-time setup. Continuous-time HAMs on asset price dynamics have been
developed recently (see Di Guilmi, He and Li 2014). We refer readers to Li (2014)
for a discussion on the advantages of the continuous-time models. Overall, these
models have successfully explained several market features (such as market booms
and crashes, deviations of the market price from the fundamental price), the stylized
facts (such as skewness, kurtosis, volatility clustering and fat tails of returns) and
the power-law behavior. Different from the extant HAMs, the focus of this paper is
on the mechanism of generating the momentum profitability.
This paper is organized as follows. We first present some empirical evidence
on the time series momentum in financial market index in Section 2. Section 3
proposes a stochastic HAM in continuous time with time delays to incorporate
fundamental, momentum and contrarian traders. To better understand the model,
Section 4 follows the standard approach in HAMs and focuses on the dynamics
of the underlying deterministic model to examine the impact of these strategies,
in particular the different time horizons, on market stability. Section 5 examines
the stochastic model numerically and investigates the connection between market
stability and profitability. Section 6 concludes. All the proofs and extensions of the
model are included in Appendices.
8 HE AND LI
2. Time Series Momentum of the S&P 500
We first provide some evidence on time series momentum in the S&P 500. Most
momentum literature is cross-sectional. The time series momentum is explored
recently in Moskowitz et al. (2012) who show that a security’s own past returns
have strong positive predictability for its future return among almost five dozen
diverse futures and forward contracts. Similar to Moskowitz et al. (2012), we apply
the momentum strategy based on the standard moving average rules (MA) to the
monthly data of the total return index of the S&P 500 from Jan. 1988 to Dec. 2012
obtained from Datastream.
We first define the trading signal for momentum trading. Let P (t) be the log


















which is a decaying weighted average of past return over a horizon of m-month.
The mean profit of a momentum strategy with m-month horizon and n-month
holding period (m,n = 1, 2, · · · , 60) is calculated as follows. The strategy is to long
(short) one unit of index for n months when the trading signal is positive (negative).
Hence, at each time t (except for t < n− 1), we have n long/short positions in the
index. The average (log) excess return of the momentum strategy at time t is















, i = 1, 2, (2.2)
where rf,t is the 1 month Treasury bill rate.
With the trading signal defined by (2.1), Table 2.1 reports the annualized (log)
excess returns of the momentum strategies for the S&P 500 with horizon (m) and
holding (n) periods from 1 to 60 months. It shows that the momentum strategies
are profitable for time horizons and holding periods up to 3 years. In particular, the
profits become significant (up to about 7% p.a.) for time horizons from 6 months
to 3 years and holding periods from 1 to 12 months. Fig. 2.1 reports the t-statistic
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Table 2.1. The annualized percentage (log) excess returns of the
momentum strategies (2.1) for the S&P 500 with horizon (m) and
holding (n) from 1 to 60 months period. Note: ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote the
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
m \ n 1 3 6 12 24 36 48 60
1 2.63 3.77∗∗ 1.99 3.43∗∗∗ 2.28∗∗ 1.96∗∗ 1.68∗ 1.34
3 1.38 2.91 3.36∗ 3.80∗∗ 3.40∗∗ 2.92∗∗ 2.50∗ 2.29∗
6 6.03∗∗ 5.01∗ 4.62∗∗ 4.39∗∗ 3.25∗ 2.45 2.21 2.02
12 7.52∗∗ 6.54∗∗ 5.93∗∗ 5.00∗∗ 2.95 2.23 2.18 2.25
24 6.57∗∗ 7.87∗∗∗ 6.16∗∗ 5.03∗ 3.08 2.37 2.30 2.55
36 6.72∗∗ 6.76∗∗ 5.55∗ 3.47 2.38 2.08 2.21 2.76
48 4.34 2.07 1.52 1.22 0.67 1.15 1.47 2.30
60 1.05 0.66 -0.56 -0.44 0.06 0.72 1.17 2.27



















Figure 2.1. The t-statistic of the average excess return of the mo-
mentum strategies the S&P 500 based on (2.1) for time horizon from
1 to 60 months periods and holding periods equal to horizon (n = m),
1 month (n = 1) and 6 month periods (n = 6) respectively.
of the excess return of the momentum strategies investing in the S&P 500 for time
horizons from 1 to 60 months and holding period equals to the time horizon (n = m),
1 month (n = 1) and 6 months (n = 6) respectively. It shows that the momentum
strategies are significantly profitable for short holding periods from 1 to 6 months
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and time horizons from 6 to 30 months with the corresponding t-statistics being
above 1.96, the critical value at 95% confidence level.
Table 2.2. The Sharpe ratio of the momentum strategies (2.1) for
the S&P 500 with horizon (m) and holding (n) from 1 to 60 months
period.
m \ n 1 3 6 12 24 36 48 60
1 0.050 0.128 0.093 0.187 0.134 0.114 0.099 0.078
3 0.026 0.070 0.106 0.137 0.138 0.122 0.105 0.095
6 0.116 0.109 0.118 0.123 0.105 0.083 0.075 0.068
12 0.145 0.135 0.129 0.116 0.077 0.062 0.060 0.061
24 0.126 0.159 0.131 0.114 0.074 0.061 0.058 0.064
36 0.129 0.135 0.117 0.076 0.056 0.051 0.054 0.068
48 0.083 0.042 0.032 0.026 0.016 0.027 0.035 0.055
60 0.020 0.014 -0.012 -0.010 0.001 0.017 0.027 0.000
We also report the Sharpe ratio of the strategies to adjust for risk, which is
defined as the ratio of the mean excess return on the (managed) portfolio and the
standard deviation of the portfolio return. If a strategy’s Sharpe ratio exceeds
the market Sharpe ratio, the active portfolio dominates the market portfolio (in
an unconditional mean-variance sense). For empirical applications, the (ex post)
Sharpe ratio is usually estimated as the ratio of the sample mean of the excess
return on the portfolio and the sample standard deviation of the portfolio return.
The average monthly return on the total return index of the S&P 500 over the period
January 1988–December 2012 is 0.76% with an estimated (unconditional) standard
deviation of 4.30%. The Sharpe ratio of the market index is 0.108. The Sharpe ratio
of the strategy based on (2.1) and (2.2) is documented in Table 2.2. Tables 2.1 and
2.2 are very consistent. Specifically, when Table 2.1 shows a momentum strategy
with certain time horizon and holding period generates significantly positive excess
return, Table 2.2 shows this strategy can also outperform the market according to
the Sharpe ratio.
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which is an equally weighted average of excess returns over the past m periods.
With the trading signal defined by (2.3), similar results are obtained and reported
in Table A.1 and Fig. A.1 in Appendix A.
3. The Model
In this section, we establish an asset pricing model of single risky asset to char-
acterize the time series momentum. The modelling approach follows closely to the
current HAM framework. By considering the financial market as an expectations
feedback mechanism, Chiarella (1992), Lux (1995) and Brock and Hommes (1997,
1998) were amongst the first to have shown that the interaction of agents with het-
erogeneous expectations may lead to market instability. By incorporating bounded
rationality and heterogeneity, HAMs have successfully explained the complexity of
market price behavior, market booms and crashes, and long deviations of the market
price from the fundamental price. They show great potentials in generating the styl-
ized facts (such as skewness, kurtosis, volatility clustering and fat tails in returns),
and various power laws (such as the long memory in return volatility) observed in
financial markets. We refer readers to Hommes (2006), LeBaron (2006), Lux (2009)
and Chiarella, Dieci and He (2009) for surveys of the recent developments in this
literature.
To examine the effect of time horizons, instead of using a discrete-time setup,
we consider a continuous-time setup in this paper with fundamentalists who trade
according to fundamental analysis and momentum and contrarian traders who trade
differently based on price trend calculated from moving averages of historical prices
over different time horizons. As in Beja and Goldman (1980), the market price is
arrived at via a market maker scenario.5 To focus on price dynamics, we motivate
the excess demand functions of the three different types of traders directly, rather
than deriving them from utility maximization of their portfolio investments. These
5As presented in O’Hara (1995), the Walrasian scenario, even though widely used in economic
analysis, only plays a part in one real market (the market for silver in London).
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demand functions are also consistent those in the discrete-time HAMs literature
derived from heterogeneous expectations and utility maximization.6
3.1. Fundamental Traders. Let P (t) and F (t) denote the log (cum dividend)
price and (log) fundamental value F (t), respectively of a risky asset at time t. The
fundamental traders believe that the market price7 P (t) is mean-reverting to the
fundamental price F (t), which can be estimated based on some fundamentals. They
buy (sell) the stock when the current price P (t) is below (above) the fundamental
price F (t) of the stock. For simplicity, we assume that the excess demand of the
fundamental traders, Df(t) at time t, is proportional to the deviation of the market
price P (t) from the fundamental value F (t), namely,
Df(t) = βf
(
F (t)− P (t)
)
, (3.1)
where βf > 0 is a constant, measuring the speed of mean-reversion of P (t) to F (t),
which may be weighted by the risk tolerance of the traders. For simplicity, we
assume that the fundamental return follows a pure white noise process:
dF (t) = σFdWF (t), F (0) = F̄ , (3.2)
where σF > 0 represents the volatility of the fundamental return and WF (t) is a
standard Wiener process.
3.2. Momentum and Contrarian Traders. Both momentum and contrarian
traders trade based on their estimated market price trends, although they behave
differently. Momentum traders believe that future market price follows a price trend
um(t). When the current market price is above the trend, they expect future market
price to rise and therefore they take a long position of the risky asset; otherwise, they
6In the traditional approach in the continuous-time literature, the usual way is to first specify
a price process and then derive the optimal demand functions. The parameters in the price
process are then determined by market clearing conditions. Because of the Markov property of
the underlying processes, the price process and utility maximization are consistent. However,
when modelling time series momentum, we do not have such consistency due to the non-Markov
property of the underlying process in general. Therefore, the demand functions are motivated from
behavioral aspects in the paper.
7For convenience, the price is referred to the log price in this paper, unless specified otherwise.
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take a short position. Different from the momentum traders, contrarians believe that
future market price goes opposite to a price trend uc(t). When the current market
price is above the trend, they expect future market price to decline and therefore
they take a short position of the risky asset; otherwise, they take a long position.
The price trend used for the momentum traders and contrarians can be different in
general. Among various price trends used in practice, the standard moving average






P (s)ds, i = m, c, (3.3)
where the time delay τi ≥ 0 represents the time horizon of the MA.8 We therefore











where the S-shaped demand function gi(x) for i = m, c satisfies
gi(0) = 0, g
′
i(x) > 0, g
′
i(0) = βi > 0, xg
′′
i (x) < 0, for x 6= 0, (3.5)
and parameter βi represents the extrapolation rate of the price trend when the
market price deviation from the trend is small. Notice the trading signal of the
strategy (3.4) is consistent with (2.1). In the following discussion, we take gi(x) =
tanh(βix), which satisfies condition (3.5).
9
8The price trend ui(t) can be regarded as the logarithm of the geometric mean of market price
over the past τi periods. Zhu and Zhou (2009) show that little performance differences emerge
in their paper with the use of geometric MA and arithmetic MA. In particular, ui(t) → P (t) as
τi → 0, implying that the price trend is given by the current price.
9 Chiarella (1992) provides an explanation for the increasing and bounded S-shaped excess
demand function. For example, traders may seek to allocate a fixed amount of wealth between
the risky asset and a bond so as to maximize their expected utility of consumption. The demand
becomes bounded due to wealth constraints. From behaviorial point of view, traders may become
cautious when the deviation of the market price from the price trend is large. This together leads
approximately to an S-shaped increasing excess demand function. For consistence, we also study
the cases when both demand functions are linear or S-shaped. We find that adding/dropping the
S-shaped demands does not affect the local stability presented in Section 4; however imposing
S-shaped demand function to the fundamentalists leads to a more “unstable” market in the sense
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3.3. Market Price via a Market Maker. Assume net zero supply in the risky
asset and let αf , αm and αc be the market population fractions of the fundamental,
momentum, and contrarian traders, respectively, with αf +αm +αc = 1 and αi > 0
for i = f,m, c.10 Then the aggregate market excess demand for the risky asset,
weighted by the population weights, is given by αfDf (t) + αmDm(t) + αcDc(t).
Following Beja and Goldman (1980), Kyle (1985) and Farmer and Joshi (2002),
we assume that the price P (t) at time t is set via a market maker mechanism and
adjusted according to the aggregate excess demand, that is,
dP (t) = µ[αfDf (t) + αmDm(t) + αcDc(t)]dt+ σMdWM(t), (3.6)
where µ > 0 represents the speed of the price adjustment by the market maker,
WM(t) is a standard Wiener process capturing the random excess demand process
driven by either noise traders or liquidity traders, and σM ≥ 0 is constant. WM(t) is
assumed to be independent of the Wiener process for the fundamental price WF (t).
11































where the fundamental price F (t) is defined by (3.2). Therefore, the asset price
dynamics is determined by the stochastic delay integro-differential equation (3.7).
As argued in Lo, Mamaysky and Wang (2000), “The general goal of technical
analysis is to identify regularities in the time series of prices by extracting nonlinear
patterns from noisy data. Implicit in this goal is the recognition that some price
that the amplitude of price fluctuation becomes greater when the original system is unstable. On
the profitability, when both demand functions are either linear or nonlinear, we find that the profit
level can be different, however the conclusion on the profitability does not change.
10To simplify the analysis, we first assume that the market fractions are constant. When agents
are allowed to switch among different strategies based on some fitness measure (see He and Li 2012),
the market fractions become time-varying. An analysis of this extension is given in Appendices D
and E.
11The two Wiener processes can be correlated. We refer readers to He and Li (2012) for related
discussion on the impact of the correlation on the price behavior and the stylized facts in financial
market.
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movements are significant—they contribute to the formation of a specific pattern—
and others are merely random fluctuations to be ignored.” We are interested in
the connection between market stability and profitability of the trading strategies.
Given the complex structure of the nonlinear model, we follow the standard ap-
proach in the HAM literature and combine the stability analysis of the underlying
deterministic model with numerical simulation of the stochastic model. By ignoring
the noises, Section 4 aims to recognize the patterns of the mean values in the noisy
price system, which underlies the profitability mechanism of momentum strategies
studied in Section 5. The stability analysis provides an insight into the effect of
the interaction and activities of different types of traders on market stability. It
helps us to understand the relation between different states of market stability and
profitability of trading strategies. Note that it is the interaction of deterministic dy-
namics and noise processes that provides a complete picture of the price dynamics
of the full stochastic model. In the following section, we first examine the stability
of the corresponding deterministic delay integro-differential equation model.
4. Market Stability
By assuming a constant fundamental price F (t) ≡ F̄ and no market noise σM =
0, system (3.7) becomes a deterministic delay integro-differential equation, which

































It is easy to see that P (t) = F̄ is the unique steady state price of the system (4.1).
We therefore call P = F̄ the fundamental steady state.
In this section, we study the dynamics of the deterministic model (4.1) by focusing
on the local stability of the fundamental steady state. Denote γi = µαiβi (i =
f,m, c), which characterize the activity of type-i traders.12 In general, the dynamics
12Intuitively, the speed of the price adjustment µ of the market maker measures the activity
across the market. Both the population size αi and behaviour activity βi qualify the trading
behaviour of type-i traders. Therefore, γi measures the activity or dominance of type i traders.
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depend on the behavior of fundamental, momentum, contrarian traders, market
maker, and time horizons. To understand the impact, we first consider two special
cases where only momentum traders or contrarians are involved.
4.1. The Stabilizing Role of the Contrarians. Contrarian trading strategies
are based on the hypothesis of market overreaction. Intuitively, contrarians can
induce market stability. To support the intuition, we consider a market with the























The following proposition confirms the stabilizing role of the contrarians.13
Proposition 4.1. The fundamental steady state price P = F̄ of the system (4.2) is
asymptotically stable for all τc ≥ 0.
Proposition 4.1 shows that the market consisting of fundamental and contrarian
investors is always stable, and the result is independent of the time horizon and
extrapolation of the contrarians.14
4.2. The Destabilizing Role of the Momentum Traders. Momentum trading
strategies based on the hypothesis of market under-reaction are aimed to explore the
opportunities of market price continuity. Intuitively, when the market is dominated
by fundamental traders, the market is expected to reflect the fundamental price and
then the impact of the momentum traders on market stability can be very limited.
However, when the market is dominated by the momentum traders, the extrapola-
tion of the market price continuity can have significant impact on market stability.
13All the proofs can be found in Appendix B.
14Note that this result is different from that in discrete-time HAMs, in which market can become
unstable when activity of contrarians is strong, see for example, Chiarella and He (2002). This
difference is due to the continuous adjustment of the market price. The impact of any strong
activity from the contrarians becomes insignificant over a small time increment. Hence the time
horizon used to form the MA becomes more irrelevant in this case.
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To explore the impact, we now consider a market consisting of the fundamentalists






















and the price dynamics can be described by the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2. The fundamental steady state price P = F̄ of the system (4.3) is
(i) asymptotically stable for all τm ≥ 0 when γm < γf1+a ;
(ii) asymptotically stable for either 0 ≤ τm < τ ∗m,l or τm > τ ∗m,h and unstable for





≤ γm ≤ γf ; and
(iii) asymptotically stable for τm < τ
∗
m,l and unstable for τm > τ
∗
m,l when γm > γf .
Here a = max{− sin x/x; x > 0}(≈ 0.2172), τ ∗m,1 = 2γm/(γf − γm)2, τ ∗m,l(< τ ∗m,1) is




(γf − γm)2 − cos
[
√
2γmτm − (γf − γm)2τ 2m
]
− 1 = 0, (4.4)
and τ ∗m,h(∈ (τ ∗m,l, τ ∗m,1)) is the maximum among all the roots of (4.4) which are less
than τ ∗m,1.
Proposition 4.2 shows that the impact of the time horizon used in forming the
MA for the momentum traders depends on γm and γf , which measure the activ-
ity or dominance of the momentum and fundamental traders, respectively. On
the one hand, when the fundamental traders dominate momentum traders (so that
γm < γf/(1+a)), the market is always stable and time horizon plays no role in mar-
ket stability. On the other hand, when momentum traders dominate fundamental
traders (so that γm > γf), the market is stable when time horizon is small (so that
τm < τ
∗
m,l), but becomes unstable when the time horizon is large (so that τm > τ
∗
m,l).
In fact, the difference between price and the price trend based on the MA becomes
insignificant when the time horizon is small and a strong activity from the momen-
tum traders has very limited impact on market stability, yielding the stability for
small time horizon. However, due to the smoothness of the MA when the time hori-
zon is longer, the difference can become significant, which, together with a strong
activity from the momentum traders, makes the market unstable. When the activ-
ity of the trend followers is balanced by that of the fundamental traders (so that
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γf/(1+a) ≤ γm ≤ γf), the market is stable when the time horizon is either short (so
that τm < τ
∗
m,l) or longer (so that τm > τ
∗
m,h), but becomes unstable with medium
time horizon (so that τ ∗m,l < τm < τ
∗
m,h). This is an unexpected result. Intuitively,
when time horizon is short, the price trend follows the price closely, which limits
the trading opportunity for the momentum traders. When horizon is longer, the
price trend becomes insensitive to the price changes. However, due to the balanced
activity from the fundamental traders, the extrapolation activity of the momentum
traders is limited. Therefore, in both cases, the market becomes stable.
4.3. The Joint Impact of Momentum and Contrarian Trading. The previous
analysis shows the different role of the time horizon used in the MA by either the
contrarians or momentum traders. We analyze the market stability when both
strategies are employed in the market. For simplicity, we consider τm ≡ τc := τ
in the rest of the paper and leave the general case with different τm and τc in
Appendix C. It is found that this special case can well reflect the impact of different
types of traders’ activities on the stability and further on their profitability. Let
τ ∗1 = 2(γm − γc)/(γf − γm + γc)2, and τ ∗l (< τ ∗1 ) and τ ∗h(∈ (τ ∗l , τ ∗1 )) be the minimum




(γf − γm + γc)2 − cos
[
√
2(γm − γc)τ − (γf − γm + γc)2τ 2
]
− 1 = 0.
In this case, the market stability of the system (4.1) can be characterized by the
following proposition.15
Proposition 4.3. If τm ≡ τc := τ , then the fundamental steady state price P = F̄
of the system (4.1) is
(1) asymptotically stable for all τ ≥ 0 when γm < γc + γf1+a ;
15Notice time horizon plays an important role in the asset price dynamics. Only very few models
have addressed this important issue. One related paper is Chiarella, He and Hommes (2006), who
study a discrete-time HAM and show that an increase of the time horizon used by momentum
traders can destabilize the market. Proposition 4.3 verifies this argument in continuous time. We
refer readers to He and Li (2012) and Di Guilmi, He and Li (2014) for more comparisons on the
role of time horizon between continuous-time and discrete-time HAMs, including local stability,
distribution of market fraction, the comovements of market fraction and market price, and some
financial stylized facts.
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(2) asymptotically stable for either 0 ≤ τ < τ ∗l or τ > τ ∗h and unstable for
τ ∗l < τ < τ
∗
h when γc +
γf
1+a
≤ γm ≤ γc + γf ; and
(3) asymptotically stable for τ < τ ∗l and unstable for τ > τ
∗
l when γm > γc + γf .
Despite the activity of both momentum and contrarian traders, Proposition 4.3
shares the same message to Proposition 4.2 with respect to the joint impact of the
time horizons and the activity of the momentum traders on market stability, except
that the activity of the fundamental traders in Proposition 4.2 is measured jointly by
the activities of the fundamental and contrarian traders in Proposition 4.3. Given
the stabilizing nature of the contrarian strategy indicated in Proposition 4.1, this is
not unexpected. The three conditions
(1) : γm < γc +
γf
1 + a
, (2) : γc +
γf
1 + a
≤ γm ≤ γc + γf , (3) : γm > γc + γf
in Proposition 4.3 characterize three different states of market stability, which have
different implications to the profitability of momentum trading strategy. For con-
venience, market state k is referred to condition (k) for k = 1, 2, 3 in the following
analysis.
To illustrate the price dynamics in different market state, we now conduct nu-
merical analysis.16 For market state 1, the fundamental price is stable, independent
of the time horizon. For market state 2, Fig. 4.1 (a) illustrates the three values17
τ ∗l ≈ 0.23, τ ∗3 ≈ 0.41, and τ ∗h ≈ 5.10. Correspondingly, Fig. 4.1 (b) shows that
the fundamental steady state price P = F̄ is stable when τ ∈ [0, τ ∗l ) ∪ (τ ∗h ,∞) and
unstable when τ ∈ (τ ∗l , τ ∗h). The stability switches twice.18 For market state 3, Fig.
4.2 (a) illustrates the first (Hopf bifurcation) value τ ∗l ≈ 0.22, which leads to stable
16The numerical results in this paper (except for the Appendices D and E) are based on αf = 0.3,
αm = 0.4, αc = 0.3, µ = 5 and F̄ = 1, unless specified otherwise.
17These values are called Hopf bifurcation values in stability theory (see Hale 1997), meaning
that the steady state loses the stability at these values and bifurcates to periodic cycles around
the steady state, as illustrated by the price bifurcation plot with respect to the time horizon τ .
18Simulations (not reported here) show that the speed of the convergence when the fundamental
steady state becomes stable after switching from instability as τ increases is very slow, although
F̄ is stable. The properties on the number of bifurcations and the stability switching are further
illustrated in Fig. B.1 in Appendix B.4. There are some interesting properties on the nature of
bifurcations related to Proposition 4.3, including the number of bifurcations, stability switching
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limit cycles for τ > τ ∗l , as shown in Fig. 4.2 (b). The stability switches only once
at τ ∗l .














(a) The function h(τ)













Figure 4.1. (a) The function h(τ); (b) the corresponding bifurcation
diagram for market state 2. Here γf = 20, γm = 22.6 and γc = 5.












(a) The function h(τ)













Figure 4.2. (a) The function h(τ); (b) the bifurcation diagram of
the market price for market state 3. Here γf = 2, γm = 20 and
γc = 10.
The above numerical analysis clearly illustrates that dependence of the market
price dynamics on the time horizon is different in different market states. We show
in the following section that the market states also have different implications on
the underreaction/overreaction and momentum profitability. We complete the dis-
cussion of this section by considering a very special case when αm = αc, βm = βc
and the dependence of the bifurcation values on the parameters. We provide a detailed analysis in
Appendix B.4.
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and τm = τc, that is the momentum and the contrarian traders have the same pop-
ulation, extrapolation rate and time horizon. In this case, system (4.1) reduces to
dP (t)/dt = γf(F̄ − P (t)). The destabilizing effect of momentum traders is com-
pletely offset by contrarians, which leads to the global stability of the fundamental
price.
5. Momentum Profitability
This section numerically examines the profitability of the time series momentum
trading strategies. We show that the profitability is closely related to the market
states defined according to the stability analysis in Section 4. In particular, we show
that, in market state 3, the momentum strategy is profitable when the time horizon
is short and unprofitable when the time horizon is long. In other market states, the
strategy is not profitable for any time horizon. We also provide some explanation
to the profitability mechanism through autocorrelation and time series analysis.
As in Section 4, we focus on the special case when momentum and contrarian
traders use the same time horizon and holding period τ . The profit is calculated us-
ing a buy-and-hold strategy on the number and position determined by the demand
function of the trading strategy.19 It follows from Eq. (3.4) that the excess demands


























Based on buy and hold strategy, the realized spot profits of fundamental, momen-
tum, contrarian traders, and the market maker at time t can be calculated by
Ui(t) = Di(t)
(
P (t+ τ)− P (t)
)
, i = f,m, c,M, (5.2)
where the excess demand of the fundamental strategy Df(t) is defined by Eq. (3.1)





, which is based on the liquidity provided to clean the market.
19Alternatively, the profit can be calculated based on buy-and-hold strategy on one unit of
position taking, as in Section 2. We find that this does not affect the profitability results obtained
in this section.
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In addition, we also calculate the average accumulated profit yielded over a time








P (s+ τ)− P (s)
)
ds, i = f,m, c,M. (5.3)
We now examine the profitability in different market states. In the rest of the
paper, the time unit is one year and the time step ∆t is one month. Given 14.9%
annually standard deviation of the log return for the S&P 500 index used in Section
2, we choose σM = 0.15 for the annual market volatility and σF = 0.1 for the annual
volatility of the fundamental price.



















(a) Average spot profits




















(b) Average accumulated profits
Figure 5.1. (a) The average spot profits of trading strategies based
on 1000 simulations; (b) the average accumulated profits based on a
typical simulation for market state 1. Here γf = 15, γm = 15 and
γc = 3 and τ = 0.5.
5.1. State 1. In market state 1, the market is dominated jointly by the fundamental
and contrarian traders (so that γm < γc+γf/(1+a)). In this case, the stability of the
fundamental price of the underlying deterministic model is independent of the time
horizon. Based on 1,000 simulations, Fig. 5.1 (a) reports the average spot profits of
different strategies and Fig. 5.1 (b) illustrates the average accumulated profits based
on a typical simulation. They show that the contrarian and fundamental strategies
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(a) τ = 0.5












(b) τ = 3
Figure 5.2. The average ACs of market return based on 1000 sim-
ulations for market state 1 with (a) τ = 0.5 and (b) τ = 3. Here
γf = 15, γm = 15 and γc = 3.
are profitable, but not the momentum strategy and the market maker.20 Note that
the amounts of profit/loss are small, which is underlined by the stable market price.
To understand the mechanism of the profitability, we present the average return
autocorrelations (ACs) based on 1000 simulations in Fig. 5.2 for τ = 0.5 in (a)
and τ = 3 in (b).21 It shows some significant and negative ACs for small lags and
insignificant ACs for large lags. This indicates market overreaction in short-run
and hence the fundamental and contrarian trading can generate significant profits.
There is no significant and positive ACs, indicating no market under-reaction, and
hence the momentum trading is not profitable.
5.2. State 2. In market state 2, the momentum traders are active, but their activi-
ties are balanced by the fundamental and contrarian traders (so that γc+γf/(1+a) ≤
γm ≤ γc + γf). In this case, the stability of the underlying deterministic model is
20Notice the profits of market maker is slightly negative by providing liquidity. But in reality,
market maker can make profits on the transaction costs and bid-ask spread. We also examine
two scenarios with medium and high transaction costs of 0.5% and 1% of the value of the trade
respectively. We find that market maker can make significant profits in these cases (not reported
here). We would like to thank a referee for this remark.
21Recently, Zhou and Zhu (2014) show that the moving average rules can explain the time series
momentum in an equilibrium model by examining the autocovariance of return for different time
horizons.
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illustrated in Fig. 4.1, showing that the fundamental price is stable for either short
or longer time horizons, but unstable for medium time horizons. With the same
parameters used in Fig. 4.1, we illustrate the profitability of the different trading
strategies in Fig. 5.3. It shows that the fundamental and contrarian trading strate-
gies are profitable, but not the momentum traders and the market maker. Further
simulations (not reported here) show the same result with different time horizons,
although the losses/profits increase as time horizon increases.













(a) Average spot profits















(b) Average accumulated profits
Figure 5.3. (a) The average spot profits based on 1,000 simulations;
(b) the average accumulated profits based on a typical simulation for
market state 2. Here γf = 20, γm = 22.6, γc = 5 and τ = 0.5.











(a) τ = 0.5









(b) τ = 3
Figure 5.4. The average ACs of market return based on 1000 sim-
ulations for market state 2 with (a) τ = 0.5 and (b) τ = 3.
As in market state 1, we also calculate the return ACs with the same set of
parameters as Fig. 4.1. Fig. 5.4 presents the average ACs based on 1000 simulations
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for time horizon τ = 0.5 in (a) and τ = 3 in (b), showing some significantly negative
ACs, in particular for τ = 0.5, over short lags. This indicates the profitability of
the fundamental and contrarian trading due to market overreaction, but not for the
momentum trading. Therefore, both states 1 and 2 lead to the same conclusion on
the profitability, although the amount of profit/loss in state 2 is higher than in state
1.
















(a) Average spot profits for τ = 0.5














(b) Average accumulated profits for τ = 0.5



















(c) Average spot profits for τ = 3


















(d) Average accumulated profits for τ = 3
Figure 5.5. The average spot profits based on 1000 simulations for
(a) τ = 0.5 and (c) τ = 3 and the average accumulated profits based
on a typical simulation for (b) τ = 0.5 and (d) τ = 3 for market state
3. Here γf = 2, γm = 20 and γc = 10.
5.3. State 3. In market state 3, the market is dominated by the momentum traders
(so that γm > γc + γf). The stability of the underlying deterministic model is illus-
trated in Fig. 4.2, showing that the fundamental price is stable for short horizons,
but unstable for longer horizons. With the same set of parameters in Fig. 4.2, we
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report the profitability of the different trading in Fig. 5.5. It shows clearly that,
for short horizon τ = 0.5, the fundamental and momentum trading strategies are
profitable, but not the contrarians, as illustrated in Figs. 5.5 (a) and (b). However,
for longer horizon τ = 3, the fundamental and contrarian strategies are profitable,
but not the momentum traders, see Figs. 5.5 (c) and (d).















(a) Time series for τ = 0.5













(b) Time series for τ = 3
Figure 5.6. Time series of price P (t) and price trend u(t) for (a)
τ = 0.5 and (b) τ = 3.
To explore the profit opportunity of the momentum trading with different time
horizons, we plot the time series of the price and price trend in Fig. 5.6 (a) for
τ = 0.5 and Fig. 5.6 (b) for τ = 3, based on the same simulation in Fig. 5.5
(b) and (d), respectively. There are two interesting observations. (i) For short
horizon τ = 0.5, the market price fluctuates due to the unstable steady state of
the underlying deterministic system. When the market price increases, the price
trend follows the market price closely and increases too, as illustrated in Fig. 5.6
(a). This implies that, with short holding period, the momentum trading strategy
is profitable by taking long positions. Similarly, when the market price declines,
the price trend follows. Hence the momentum trading is profitable by taking short
positions. Therefore, the momentum trading is profitable (except for the starting
periods of sudden changes in the price tendency). (ii) For longer horizon τ = 3,
the market price fluctuates widely due to the unstable fundamental value of the
underlying deterministic system. The relation between market price and price trend
is similar to the case for the short horizon, as illustrated in Fig. 5.6 (b). However,
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a longer horizon makes the price trend less sensitive to the changes in price. Also,
since the holding period is also longer, the momentum trading mis-matches the
profitability opportunity. For example, when the market price reaches a peak at
t ≈ 50 (months), which is higher than the trend, the momentum traders take a long
position in the stock. After holding the stocks for 3 years, they sell at a much lower
price at t ≈ 86, implying a loss from the momentum strategy. This illustrates that,
with longer horizon, the momentum trading is not profitable.











(a) τ = 0.5











(b) τ = 3
Figure 5.7. The average ACs of market return based on 1000 sim-
ulations for market state 3 with (a) τ = 0.5 and (b) τ = 3.

















(a) Average spot profits














(b) Average accumulated profits
Figure 5.8. (a) The average spot profits based on 1,000 simulations;
(b) the average accumulated profits based on a typical simulation for
market state 3 with 3 years horizon and 0.5 year holding period.
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To provide further insight into the profitability mechanism, we calculate the return
ACs and present the results in Fig. 5.7. It shows clearly the market under-reaction in
short run and overreaction in long run, characterized by significantly positive ACs
for short lags and negative ACs for long lags for both short and longer horizons.
With the short horizon and holding period, the momentum trading is profitable
due to the under-reaction in short-run (Fig. 5.7 (a)). However with the long time
horizon, the momentum trading is no longer profitable for long holding period due
to the overreaction in long-run (Fig. 5.7 (b)), although it can be profitable with
short holding period due to the under-reaction illustrated in Fig. 5.7 (b), which is
verified in Fig. 5.8 with 3 years horizon and 6 month holding period. This result is
consistent with Lou and Polk (2013).
Table 5.1. The annualized percentage (log) excess returns of mo-
mentum strategy (2.1) for the time series generated from the model
in market state 3 with horizon (m) and holding (n) from 1 to 60
months period. Note: ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote the significance at 10%, 5%
and 1% levels, respectively.
m \ n 1 3 6 12 24 36 48 60
1 1.23 3.30 3.05∗∗ 3.09∗∗∗ 1.71∗∗ 0.44 -0.17 -0.42
3 2.78 3.21 4.73∗∗ 4.16∗∗ 2.68∗∗ 0.25 -0.42 -0.55
6 2.48 3.85 5.74∗∗ 5.09∗∗ 2.29 -0.37 -1.41 -1.15
12 6.89∗∗ 7.87∗∗ 8.12∗∗∗ 5.91∗∗ 1.48 -1.78 -2.50∗ -1.99
24 9.92∗∗∗ 9.89∗∗∗ 7.40∗∗ 2.89 -2.71 -4.82∗∗ -3.82∗ -2.14
36 8.84∗∗ 5.43 2.16 -1.79 -6.22∗∗ -7.57∗∗∗ -5.44∗∗ -3.34∗
48 5.00 2.41 -0.01 -3.66 -7.76∗∗∗ -8.52∗∗∗ -5.91∗∗∗ -3.57∗
60 2.50 -0.03 -2.01 -5.25 -9.00∗∗∗ -9.19∗∗∗ -6.15∗∗∗ -3.63∗
It would be interesting to see if the model is able to replicate the time series
momentum profit explored for the S&P 500 in Section 2 based on the momentum
strategies (2.1) and (2.3). Table 5.1 reports the annual excess returns of various
momentum trading strategies based on (2.1) investing in the model generated data
in market state 3 for time horizon and holding period from 1 to 60 months. Fig. 5.9
reports the corresponding t-statistic of the average excess return of the momentum
strategies for time horizon from 1 to 60 months periods and holding period equals to
horizon, 1 month and 6 month periods respectively. Similar results based on trading
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Figure 5.9. The t-Statistic of the average excess return of the mo-
mentum strategy (2.1) investing in the model generated data in market
state 3 for time horizon from 1 to 60 months periods and holding equal
to horizon (n = m), 1 month (n = 1) and 6 month periods (n = 6)
respectively.
strategy (2.3) are reported in Table A.2 and Fig. A.2 in Appendix A. We see that
both the profit and t-statistic patterns generated from the model are very similar to
the S&P 500 reported in Section 2. The results are consistent with Moskowitz et al.
(2012) who find that the time series momentum strategy with 12 months horizon
and 1 month holding is the most profitable among others.
To complete this section, we add the following remarks. (i) The analysis of this
paper focuses on the same time horizon and holding period. An extension to dif-
ferent time horizon and holding period is presented in Appendix C. (ii) Simulations
(not reported here) show that the level of profitability of momentum (contrarian)
strategy is positively (negatively) related to βm and negatively (positively) related
to βc. Also, the level of profitability of both momentum and contrarian strategies
is positive related to the price adjustment speed µ. (iii) The time horizon τ can
affect the profitability greatly. Recall that the stability of the system depends on
γi = µαiβi (i = f,m, c) and τ completely and the profitability is closely related
to the market states. (iv) When investors switch their trading strategies based on
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some fitness functions, we extend the model in Appendices D and E and show that
the profits/losses can be enhanced due to the switching among different trading
strategies.
6. Conclusion
Based on market underreaction and overreaction hypotheses, momentum and con-
trarian strategies are widely used by financial market practitioners and their prof-
itability has been extensively investigated by academics. However, most behavioral
models do not specify the time horizon, which plays a crucial role in the perfor-
mance of momentum and contrarian strategies. Following the recent development
in the heterogeneous agent models literature, this paper proposes a continuous-time
heterogeneous agent model of investor behavior consisting of fundamental, contrar-
ian, and momentum strategies. The underlying stochastic delay integro-differential
equation of the model provides a unified approach to deal with different time hori-
zons of momentum and contrarian strategies. By examining their impact on market
stability explicitly and analyzing the profitability numerically, this paper examines
the profitability of the time series momentum trading strategies. We show that the
profitability is closely related to the market states defined by the stability of the un-
derlying deterministic model. In particular, we show that, in market state 3 where
the momentum traders dominate the market, the momentum strategy is profitable
when the time horizon is short and unprofitable when the time horizon is long. In
other market states, the strategy is not profitable for any time horizon. We also
provide some explanation to the profitability mechanism through autocorrelation
patterns and the under-reaction and overreaction hypotheses. In addition, we show
that the momentum strategy works in the stock index.
Although the model proposed in this paper is very simple, it provides an insight
into the time series momentum documented in recent empirical literature. As we
discussed in the introduction, the time series momentum plays a very important
role in explaining cross-sectional momentum, which had been widely researched in
the literature. Motivated by the results obtained in this paper, one can extend the
market of one risky asset to one with many risky assets so that the profitability
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of portfolios constructed from momentum and contrarian strategies can be exam-
ined. We would expect the same mechanism can be used to explain cross-sectional
momentum. In addition, it has been shown that volatility can affect the autocorre-
lations in returns and hence affect profitability and even trading volume. This could
be examined by using the setup in this paper. We leave these for future research.
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Appendix A. Time Series Momentum Profit
Table A.1. The annualized percentage (log) excess returns of the
momentum strategies (2.3) for the S&P 500 with horizon (m) and
holding (n) from 1 to 60 months period. Note: ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote the
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
m \ n 1 3 6 12 24 36 48 60
1 1.64 3.61∗∗ 1.61 3.00∗∗∗ 2.01∗∗ 2.01∗∗ 1.55∗ 1.12
3 1.15 2.15 2.88 3.34∗∗ 2.67∗ 1.88 1.57 1.25
6 4.21 4.39∗ 5.47∗∗ 4.67∗∗ 2.74 1.77 1.67 1.37
12 9.24∗∗∗ 7.81∗∗∗ 6.72∗∗ 5.22∗∗ 2.83 1.82 1.70 1.82
24 7.20∗∗ 6.92∗∗ 5.47∗ 3.81 2.28 1.68 8 1.83 2.68
36 3.98 4.50 2.80 1.58 0.72 0.93 1.55 2.97
48 1.76 0.14 -1.19 -1.94 -1.59 -0.43 1.30 2.51
60 -2.55 -4.24 -4.84 -3.86 -2.11 0.07 1.80 2.74



















Figure A.1. The t-Statistic of the average excess return of the mo-
mentum strategies (2.3) investing the S&P 500 for time horizon from 1
to 60 months periods and holding equal to horizon (n = m), 1 month
(n = 1) and 6 month periods (n = 6) respectively.
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Table A.2. The annualized percentage (log) excess returns of the
momentum strategies (2.3) for the time series generated from the
model in market state 3 with horizon (m) and holding (n) from 1
to 60 months period. Note: ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denote the significance at 10%,
5% and 1% levels, respectively.
m \ n 1 3 6 12 24 36 48 60
1 1.81 3.53 3.28∗∗ 3.20∗∗∗ 1.78∗∗ 0.44 -0.17 -0.42
3 3.38 3.28 4.93∗∗ 4.56∗∗∗ 2.46∗ 0.33 -0.28 -0.32
6 6.35∗ 6.57∗∗ 6.02∗∗ 5.46∗∗ 1.75 -0.72 -1.63 -1.20
12 6.86∗∗ 7.29∗∗ 7.09∗∗ 4.74∗ 0.58 -2.50 -2.95∗∗ -2.64∗∗
24 5.22 5.28 3.94 0.82 -3.02 -4.85∗∗ -3.97∗ -2.46
36 1.32 0.24 -1.61 -4.91 -7.96∗∗∗ -7.81∗∗∗ -5.39∗∗ -3.23
48 -1.46 -2.69 -4.30 -6.57∗∗ -8.66∗∗∗ -7.61∗∗∗ -4.99∗∗ -3.28
60 -2.42 -5.80 -6.47∗ -6.31∗ -6.97∗∗ -5.83∗ -4.14 -2.71



















Figure A.2. The t-Statistic of the average excess return of the mo-
mentum strategy (2.3) investing in the model generated data in market
state 3 for time horizon from 1 to 60 months periods and holding equal
to horizon (n = m), 1 month (n = 1) and 6 month periods (n = 6)
respectively.
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Appendix B. Proofs and Remarks of the Deterministic Model
The characteristic equation of the system (4.1) at the fundamental steady state
P = F̄ is given by22





(1− e−λτc) = 0. (B.1)
For delay integro-differential equation, the eigenvalue analysis can be complicated.
B.1. Proof of Proposition 4.1. The characteristic equation (B.1) reduces to
λ+ γf + γc −
γc
λτc
(1− e−λτc) = 0, (B.2)
which has no zero eigenvalue. The root of (B.2) has negative real part −γf when
τc → 0. Let λ = iω(ω > 0) be a root of Eq. (B.2). Substituting it into Eq. (B.2)
and separating the real and imaginary parts yield
ω2τc − γc(cosωτc − 1) = 0, ωτc(γf + γc)− γc sinωτc = 0,
which lead to
ω2τ 2c + 2τcγc + τ
2
c (γf + γc)
2 = 0, (B.3)
However equation (B.3) cannot be true for τc > 0, hence λ 6= iω.
It is known that, as τc varies, the sum of the multiplicities of roots of Eq. (B.2)
in the open right half-plane can change only if a root appears on or crosses the
imaginary axis (see Ruan and Wei 2003 and Li and Wei 2009). Therefore, all roots
of Eq. (B.2) have negative real parts for all τc ≥ 0. This implies the local stability
of the system (4.2).
B.2. Proof of Proposition 4.2. The characteristic equation (B.1) collapses to
λ+ γf − γm +
γm
λτm
(1− e−λτm) = 0, (B.4)
which has no zero eigenvalue. Substituting λ = iω(ω > 0) into Eq. (B.4) and
separating the real and imaginary parts yield
ω2τm + γm(cosωτm − 1) = 0, ωτm(γf − γm) + γm sinωτm = 0. (B.5)
22It is known (see Hale 1997) that the stability is characterised by the eigenvalues of the char-
acteristic equation of the system at the steady state.
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x and y2 := sin x have no intersection for x > 0, hence the second
equation in (B.5) cannot hold and Eq. (B.4) has no pure imaginary root. Corre-
spondingly, Eq. (B.4) has no root appearing on the imaginary axis. In addition,
Eq. (B.4) has only one negative eigenvalue when τm → 0. Therefore, all roots of
Eq. (B.4) have negative real parts for all τm ≥ 0 when γm < γf/(1+a), which leads
to the local stability of the system (4.3).
Next, we consider the case of γm ≥ γf/(1 + a). If follows from Eq. (B.5) that









, Eq. (B.6) has no solution, implying that λ = iω is
not an eigenvalue. Hence there is no stability switching for τm > τ
∗
m,1. Substituting
λ = ℜ{λ}+ iℑ{λ} into Eq. (B.4) and separating the real and imaginary parts yield
ℜ2{λ}+ ℑ2{λ}+ (γf − γm)ℜ{λ}+
γm
τm
(1− e−ℜ{λ}τm cosℑ{λ}) = 0,
2ℜ{λ}ℑ{λ}+ (γf − γm)ℑ{λ}+
γm
τm
e−ℜ{λ}τm sinℑ{λ}τm = 0.
(B.7)
When τm → ∞, if there exists a root λ with ℜ{λ} > 0, then (B.7) reduces to
ℜ2{λ}+ ℑ2{λ}+ (γf − γm)ℜ{λ} = 0,
2ℜ{λ}ℑ{λ}+ (γf − γm)ℑ{λ} = 0,
(B.8)
which hold only when γm > γf . Note that (B.8) cannot hold with ℜ{λ} = 0 since
(B.4) has no zero eigenvalue. Therefore, (B.4) has at least one root with positive real
part for γm > γf and all roots with negative real parts for γm ≤ γf when τm → ∞.
So the fundamental steady state of system (4.3) is asymptotically stable for γm ≤ γf
and unstable for γm > γf when τm > τ
∗
m,1. However, if τm < τ
∗
m,1, by substituting
Eq. (B.6) into the first equation of (B.5) we have
τm
γm
(γf − γm)2 − cos
[
√
2γmτm − (γf − γm)2τ 2m
]
− 1 = 0. (B.9)
Let τ ∗m,l be the minimum positive root of (B.9). Then all the eigenvalues of Eq.
(B.4) have negative real parts when 0 ≤ τm < τ ∗m,l and Eq. (B.4) has a pair of
pure imaginary roots when τm = τ
∗





|τm=τ∗m,l 6= 0. So P = F̄ undergoes a Hopf bifurcation at τm = τ ∗m,l.
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Furthermore, the stability switching happens only once when γm > γf and only
twice when γf/(1 + a) ≤ γm ≤ γf . In fact, the stability switching23 at a bi-





|τm=τ∗m . An in-
crease in τm near the bifurcation value τ
∗
m may result in a switching of the steady
state from stable to unstable when ∆(τ ∗m) > 0 and from unstable to stable when
∆(τ ∗m) < 0. For a Hopf bifurcation value τ
∗






















) . Let τ ∗m,2 :=
2γm−γf
(γf−γm)2
(< τ ∗m,1). Then











an unstable fundamental steady state cannot become stable as τm varies within
(τ ∗m,l, τ
∗
m,2) and a stable fundamental steady state cannot become unstable as τm
varies within (τ ∗m,2,∞). When γm > γf , it has been proved that P = F̄ is stable for
τm < τ
∗
m,l and unstable for either τm in some right neighborhood of τ
∗
m,l or τm > τ
∗
m,1.





m,h be the largest of the roots of Eq. (B.9) that are less than τ
∗
m,1.
When γf/(1 + a) ≤ γm ≤ γf , P = F̄ is stable for either τm < τ ∗m,l or τm > τ ∗m,1.
Due to τ ∗m,h is a Hopf bifurcation and ∆(τ
∗
m,h) < 0, P = F̄ is unstable for τ in some





implying that P = F̄ is unstable for τ ∗m,l < τm < τ
∗
m,h and stable for either τm < τ
∗
m,l
or τm > τ
∗
m,h. This completes the proof.
B.3. Proof of Proposition 4.3. The characteristic equation (B.1) becomes
λ+ γf − γm + γc +
γm − γc
λτ
(1− e−λτ ) = 0. (B.10)
Substituting λ = iω(ω > 0) into Eq. (B.10) and separating the real and imaginary
parts yield
ω2τ + (γm − γc)(cosωτ − 1) = 0,
ωτ(γf − γm + γc) + (γm − γc) sinωτ = 0.
(B.11)
23For simplicity, we arbitrarily assume that the bifurcating periodic solutions are stable and can
be globally extended, which can be observed in the numerical simulations. We refer to He et al
(2009) for the computation of stability and the proof of global existence for the periodic solutions.
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We first consider the case of γm ≤ γc. In this case, the first equation of (B.11)
cannot hold, meaning that equation (B.10) has no pure imaginary root. Note that
(B.10) has no zero eigenvalue and the root of (B.10) is negative when τ → 0. Hence
all the roots of (B.10) have negative real parts for τ ≥ 0, leading to the local stability
of the steady state.
Second, we consider the case of γm > γc. In this case, if γc < γm < γc+γf/(1+a)
then the second equation of (B.11) cannot hold, implying that λ 6= iω. However, if
γm ≥ γc+ γf/(1+ a), similar discussion to Appendix A2, we have the local stability
for γm ≤ γf + γc and instability for γm > γf + γc when τ > τ ∗1 := 2(γm−γc)(γf−γm+γc)2 .
When τ < τ ∗l , where τ
∗
l is the minimum positive roof of the following equation
τ
γm−γc
(γf − γm + γc)2 − cos
[
√
2(γm − γc)τ − (γf − γm + γc)2τ 2
]
− 1 = 0, all the
eigenvalues of Eq. (B.10) have negative real parts. When τ = τ ∗l , Eq. (B.10) has a
pair of purely imaginary roots.
Therefore, the stability switching happens only once when γm > γc+ γf and only
twice when γc + γf/(1 + a) ≤ γm < γc + γf , and consequently completes the proof.
B.4. Some Remarks on Proposition 4.3. These remarks provide some prop-
erties on the nature of bifurcations related to Proposition 4.3, including the number
of bifurcations, stability switching and the dependence of the bifurcation values on
the parameters of the model.
First, it follows from the proof in Appendix A3 that all the roots of h(τ) except
τ = τ ∗1 are Hopf bifurcation values. Note that h(τ
∗
1 ) = 0. However, we know that
ω = 0 if and only if τ = τ ∗1 . Hence τ
∗
1 is not a bifurcation value.
Second, when γc + γf/(1 + a) ≤ γm < γc + γf , the number of bifurcations de-




that h(τ ∗1 − 0) > 0. Note that h(0) < 0, h(τ) is continuous and y = h(τ) is
not tangent to y = 0 when | γf
γm−γc
− 1 |6= 2
(1+2k)π
, k = 0, 1, 2, · · · . Therefore
if | γf
γm−γc
− 1 |6= 2
(1+2k)π
, then h(τ) has odd roots when τ ∈ (0, τ ∗1 ), that is, the
number of the Hopf bifurcation that the fundamental steady state price P = F̄
undergoes in the interval (0, τ ∗1 ) must be odd. Furthermore, the number of the
Hopf bifurcation that the fundamental steady state price P = F̄ can undergo
in the interval (0, τ ∗1 ) increases when γf + γc → γm. In fact, we have h′(τ) =






2(γm − γc)τ − (γf − γm + γc)2τ 2. When γf+γc → γm,
maxτ
{√
2(γm − γc)τ − (γf − γm + γc)2τ 2
}
→ ∞, hence the sign of h′(τ) can change
many times. This implies that the number of roots of h(τ) increases in this case.
Despite the facts that the number of bifurcations defined by h(τ ∗) = 0 is odd and
the number of the Hopf bifurcation increases when γf + γc → γm, Proposition 4.3
shows that the stability switches only twice. This is verified numerically in Fig. 4.1
and Fig. B.1. In Fig. 4.1 (a), there are three Hopf bifurcation values, while in Fig.
B.1 (a), there are five bifurcation values. However, the stability switches only twice
in Fig. 4.1 (b) and Fig. B.1 (b).














(a) The function h(τ)













Figure B.1. (a) The function h(τ); (b) the bifurcation diagram of
the market price. Here γf = 20, γm = 22.8 and γc = 5.
Finally, the first bifurcation value τ ∗l depends on the population fractions, the
extrapolation rates and the speed of the price adjustment. It increases as γf or γc
increase, or γm decreases, however it is always bounded away from zero and infinity.
In fact, when γm ≥ γc + γf/(1 + a), let x =
√
2(γm − γc)τ − (γf − γm + γc)2τ 2.









τ = 0 implies x = 0 and x(τ) is an increasing function of τ . Hence the first
bifurcation value τ ∗l corresponds the minimum positive root x
∗
l of the following




− cosx = 0. It can be shown that π
2
< x∗l < π
and while | γf−γm+γc
γm−γc
| decreases, x∗l increases, implying that τ ∗l increases. Therefore,
when γc + γf/(1 + a) ≤ γm ≤ γc + γf , the first bifurcation value τ ∗l increases as
either γf or γc decrease, or γm increases. When γm > γc + γf , the first bifurcation
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value τ ∗l increases as either γf or γc increase, or γm decreases. Furthermore, let
xmin = {
√
1− ax2 + cosx = 0 | π
2
< x < π}(≈ 2.5536). Because of γf−γm+γc
γm−γc
< a,
we have xmin < x
∗
l < π, implying τ(xmin) < τ
∗
l < τ(π), where
τ(xmin) =
γm − γc
















(γf − γm + γc)4
− π
2
(γf − γm + γc)2
.
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Appendix C. The General Case with Any Positive τm and τc
In the general case, the market stability of the system (4.1) can be characterized
by the following proposition.
Proposition C.1. The fundamental steady state price of the system (4.1) is
(i) asymptotically stable for all τm, τc ≥ 0 when γm < γc + γf1+a ;




γm ≤ γc + γf ; and
(iii) asymptotically stable for τm, τc < τ
∗
l when γm > γc + γf .
Proof. We first consider the case of γm ≤ γc + γf/(1 + a).24 Suppose there exist
τ
(1)
m ≥ 0 and τ (1)c ≥ 0 such that the fundamental steady state P = F̄ of system (4.1) is



















































































. Repeating the above process, we




m ] ⊃ [τ (2)c , τ (2)m ] ⊃ [τ (3)c , τ (3)m ] ⊃ · · ·
and limn→∞(τ
(n)
m − τ (n)c ) = 0.25 By the nested interval theorem, there exists a
τ (∞) ∈ [τ (n)c , τ (n)m ] such that τ (n)m → τ (∞) as n → ∞. So P = F̄ is unstable when
(τm, τc) =
(
τ (∞), τ (∞)
)
, which contradicts Proposition 4.3. Therefore, P = F̄ is
stable for all τm, τc ≥ 0 when γm ≤ γc + γf/(1 + a).
Similarly, items (ii) and (iii) can be proved.

Simulations (not reported here) show that if momentum traders do not dominate
the market (γm ≤ γc+ γf), then momentum traders always lose no matter how long
time horizons are used, and contrarians can make profits when τm and τc are large,
24Assume arbitrarily again that the stable periodic solutions bifurcating from the Hopf bifurca-






2 is a bifurcation value, then by the definition of bifurcation, we can choose a proper
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and lose when τc is small and τm is large. If momentum traders dominate the market
(γm > γc + γf), then, for any given τc > 0, momentum strategy is profitable when
τm is small and unprofitable when τm is big; and the profitabilities for contrarians
are opposite for any given τm > 0. These results are consistent with the analysis in
Section 5.
Appendix D. Population Evolution between Momentum and
Contrarian Traders
To focus on the impact of time horizons, we consider a special case of fixed market
fractions in previous sections, which have shown that the time horizons and the joint
impact of different traders play very important roles in the stability of market price
and profitability. In this section we investigate the impact of population evolution on
the market price and profitability. The switching mechanism follows the modelling
in He and Li (2012).
Let qf (t), qm(t) and qc(t) be the market fractions of fundamentalists, momentum
traders and contrarians respectively. We first suppose there is no switching between
fundamentalists and chartists and choose constant market fraction of fundamental-
ists qf(t) = αf . Assume the market fractions of the two kinds of chartists have a
fixed component and a time varying component. Letmm andmc be the fixed propor-
tions of momentum and contrarian traders who stay with their strategy over time,
respectively. Then 1−αf −mm −mc is the proportion of chartists who may switch
from one strategy to the other: we denote them as switching or adaptively rational
chartists. Among switching chartists, denote by nm(t) and nc(t) = 1 − nm(t) the
proportions of momentum and contrarian traders at time t, respectively. Therefore,
qm(t) = mm + (1−αf −mm −mc)nm(t) and qc(t) = mc + (1−αf −mm −mc)nc(t).
The net profits of the momentum and contrarian strategies over a short time inter-
val [t − dt, t] can be measured respectively by πm(t)dt = Dm(t)dP (t) − Cmdt and
πc(t)dt = Dc(t)dP (t)− Ccdt, where Cm, Cc ≥ 0 are constant costs of the strategies
per unit time. To measure performance of the strategies, we introduce a cumulated
profits by Ui(t) = η
∫ t
−∞
e−η(t−s)πi(s)ds, i = m, c, where η > 0 represents a decay pa-
rameter of the historical profits. That is the performance is defined by a cumulated
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dt, i = m, c. Following Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998)
(Chapter 7), the evolution dynamics of the market populations are governed by
dni(t) = βni(t)[dUi(t)− dŪ(t)], i = m, c, where dŪ(t) = nm(t)dUm(t) + nc(t)dUc(t)
is the average performance of the two strategies and the switching intensity β > 0
is a constant, measuring the intensity of choice. In particular, if β = 0, there is no
switching between strategies, while for β → ∞ all agents switch immediately to the
better strategy.
To sum up, by letting U(t) = Um(t)−Uc(t), π(t) = πm(t)−πc(t) and C = Cm−Cc,







dP (t) = µ
[










qf(t) = αf , qm(t) = mm + (1− αf −mm −mc)nm(t),










F (t)− P (t)
)































26Hommes, Kiseleva, Kuznetsov and Verbic (2012) investigate the impact of time horizons in the
fitness measure for switching on market stability. Different from the discrete-time HAMs, the time
horizons do not affect the local stability and bifurcation analysis in the continuous-time HAMs.
This is due to the fact that they are in higher order terms and they affect the nonlinear dynamics,
rather than the dynamics of the linearized system.
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D.1. Dynamics of the Deterministic Model. The deterministic skeleton of






















whose steady state is (P, U) = (F̄ ,−C), consisting of the constant fundamental
price and the strategy cost disparity.
If there is no intensity of choice, that is β = 0, then the system (D.2) reduces to the
constant population model (4.1) with the constant market population fractions of the






). For the case of
β > 0, at the fundamental steady state, the proportions of the switching momentum





:= n∗c respectively, and hence
the market fractions of momentum and contrarian traders become qm(t) = mm +
1−αf−mm−mc
1+eβC
:= α∗m and qc(t) = mc +
1−αf−mm−mc
1+e−βC
:= α∗c respectively. Obviously,





for any β. This makes sense because the difference in
profits is zero at the fundamental steady state. However, if C > 0, that is costs
for momentum strategy exceed the costs for contrarian trading rules, then there
are more contrarians than momentum traders among the switching chartists at the
fundamental steady state, i.e., n∗c ≥ n∗m. (If C < 0, then n∗c ≤ n∗m.) Furthermore,
when C > 0, an increase in β leads to a decrease in n∗m, the fraction using the
expensive momentum strategy. This makes economic sense. There is no point in
paying any cost at a fundamental steady state for a trading strategy that yields no
extra profit at that fundamental steady state. As intensity of choice β increases, the
mass on the most profitable strategy in net terms increases.
We still use γi, i = f,m, c to characterize the activity of type-i agent, where
γf = µαfβf , γm = µα
∗
mβm and γc = µα
∗
cβc. Then the characteristic equation of the
system (D.2) at the fundamental steady state (P, U) = (F̄ ,−C) is given by
(λ+ η)
(
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Notice η > 0 and the second multiplication factor of Eq. (D.3) shares the same
form as the characteristic equation (B.1) except for the expression of γm and γc. So
the price dynamics of the system (D.2) can be characterized by Proposition C.1.
(a) βf = 4.7, βm = 7.5, βc = 6.7 and C = −2 (b) βf = 3.33, βm = 7.5, βc = 6.67 and C = 2
Figure D.1. Price bifurcation with respect to β for (a) C < 0 and
(b) C > 0.
Simulations show that the population evolution can enlarge the period and os-
cillation amplitude of the market price (not reported here). We choose αf = 0.3,
mm = 0.3, mc = 0.2, µ = 10, η = 0.5, τm = 1.2, τc = 1.2 and F̄ = 1. When
β = 0, we have γm < γc + γf/(1 + a) and Proposition C.1 (i) shows that the steady
state of the system (D.2) is stable for all τm, τc ≥ 0. However, one can verify that
γm > γc+γf/(1+a) when the intensity of choice β is greater than 0.11. Proposition
C.1 (ii) and (iii) demonstrate that the steady state is unstable when τm, τc ∈ (τ ∗l , τ ∗h).
The results are illustrated in Fig. D.1 (a). On the other hand, when C > 0, an
increase in the intensity of choice β may stabilize the unstable market price as shown
in Fig. D.1 (b). When the intensity of choice is small (β < 0.12), the market price
is unstable. With the increase in β, the market price becomes stable. Therefore,
the population evolution has a conditional impact on the market stability.
D.2. Profitability. For small switching intensity β, numerical simulations (not re-
ported here) on the profitability in this case coincide with the profitability results of
the no switching model (3.7) that (i) the fundamentalists profit and market maker
loses in general. (ii) When momentum traders dominate the market, they profit for
small time horizon but lose for big time horizon; contrarians with long time horizon
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can profit but lose with short time horizon. (iii) When momentum traders do not
dominate the market, contrarian strategy can always profit but momentum strategy
always loses. But simulations also show that the switching can enlarge the profits
and losses by choosing the same parameters (the market fraction parameters being
chosen to satisfy αj = α
∗
j , j = m, c) for the no switching model (3.7) and switching
model (D.1).
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Appendix E. Population Evolution among Fundamentalist,
Momentum and Contrarian Traders
Let qf (t) = mf + (1 −mf −mm −mc)nf (t) where mf is the fixed proportion of
fundamentalists who stay with their strategy over time and nf (t) is the proportion
of fundamentalists among the switching traders. The technique of modelling pop-
ulation evolution among fundamentalist, momentum and contrarian traders in this
section is the same as previous section. Then the market price of the risky asset is













dP (t) = µ
[















qf (t) = 1− qm(t)− qc(t), qm(t) = mm + (1−mf −mm −mc)nm(t),
qc(t) = mc + (1−mf −mm −mc)nc(t), nm(t) =
1




















The steady state of the deterministic part of the system (E.1) is (P, U1, U2) =
(F̄ ,−C1,−C2) and the dynamics can be also characterized by Proposition C.1.
The profitability property is consistent with that in Appendix D.
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